fa.analytic-philosophy Google Group

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work? --And Happy New Year--

2009-01-06T13:39:47Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...>
wrote:
You are misreading me. The "latter" is the represented *location* of
the representational state that's represented as part of its
*content*. Compare visual perception. I see some mountain three miles
ahead (or elsewhere due to some illusion). The fact that I see it

[analytic] Entanglement as Momentum Conservation??

2009-01-06T11:57:47Z

>>[Richard]: ... Entanglement is an example of the strangeness of
>>subatomic particles. It is a proven fact that it occurs, but so far
>>there is no explanation as to why it does.
>[Georges]: It's simply an instance of momentum conservation, albeit
>totally inexplicable when dressed up in Copenhagen Emperor's New

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work?

2009-01-06T11:54:12Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...>
wrote:
<snip>
This isn't quite the same claim.
You said thoughts were literally occurring in the head and dismissed
Putnam's claims to the contrary on the ground that "meaning ie
reference isn't confined to brains. A thought can be represented in

Re: [analytic-borders] human and computer language

2009-01-06T11:35:11Z

Oh, and work by Igor Aleksander, who has been one of the most fervent
supporters of computer analogies for human abilities.

Re: [analytic-borders] human and computer language

2009-01-06T10:56:57Z

I'm sure there must be lots, although not necessarily coming up with
titles that fit exactly! I'm no expert, but here are a few thoughts
that may possibly help to find something useful.
There are interesting papers on "Analysis and Computation" (where
Analysis is taken in the philosophical sense) by L Jonathan Cohen.

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work? --And Happy New Year--

2009-01-06T10:28:19Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, "yandahirbazoot"
I was reacting to your claim about the rock--that "for a rock to be
conscious there would have to be experiences of the environment form
a point of view that corresponded to the position of the rock, and
knowledge that this point of view did correspond to that of the rock,

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work?

2009-01-06T09:25:10Z

Hi Stuart,
I must respond quite selectively to your long post. I focus on the
bits that appear to me to offer the best opportunities for clearing
up sources of mutual misunderstanding. I also clip many long and
thoughtful comments with which I simply agree. Rest assured that I
read everything you take the care to write before I respond. But I'd

[analytic] Re: Is a programmed mind a mind?

2009-01-06T06:04:30Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@...>
wrote:
<swmaerske@>
with
analyze. But
both
dualist.
explanation
One
The issue isn't just what Searle says explicitly but what is to be
found as implicit in his argument.
Insofar as it is deployed against models like Dennett's it is

[analytic] Re: Fallibilism and dispositionalism about colors.

2009-01-06T03:24:11Z

propositions
You did, very well. Thank you.
I think it a mistake to cast Sellars as a phenomenalist in anything
like the way British empiriscists have been about Ideas or
contemporary believers in qualia mosty are. For Sellars, the
undefeasibility of self-ascriptions of "seeming" and "looking" is

[analytic] Re: Is a programmed mind a mind?

2009-01-06T01:17:35Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, "Peter D Jones" <peterdjones@...>
wrote:
wrote:
"Of course my arguments here have hinged on my claim that we can
explain mind in just this way, i.e., that a Dennettian (or similar)
model is a viable candidate for describing (and thus explaining)
mind, contra the claims of some, like Searle, that it is not."

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work? --And Happy New Year--

2009-01-05T20:55:18Z

I can't really say I understand much of this.
You aren't complaining of me that I'm supposing we sit inside our
heads looking at a sort of television screen of the world are you?--
As if I was saying 'It's of the world, but we are seeing it inside
our heads, like a television screen might be of the world, but I see

[analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work?

2009-01-05T16:48:26Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...>
wrote:
distinctly
vocabulary
long
Maybe but (tho I think PDJ has disagreed with me about this at some
past point), I can't really imagine any sensible scientific testing
of this "theory." Thus, it's philosophical in the sense of being

[analytic] Re: Animal belief again

2009-01-05T16:12:45Z

--- In analy...@yahoogroups.com, Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...>
wrote:
belief to
PB,
Quite true. So, have you read his work in any of those possible
places? Call me an old stick-im-the-mud, but when the issue is what
Stich said, I like to have the text in front of me, or at least a few
relevant quotations.

[analytic] Re: Fallibilism and dispositionalism about colors.

2009-01-05T15:59:38Z

Hi again, Pierre.
I was just wondering if the Sellarsian position you've described here
can be found in any of the papers in his "Philosophical Perspectives"
(the only collection of his I still have)--or in anything available
on-line (like his correspondence with Firth). Thanks.
W
<houlepn@>
(i)

Re: [analytic] Re: Does honest physicalism work?

2009-01-05T15:54:30Z

It's a mistake to assume Stich argued we should not attribute belief to
animals in one place only.
PB
-----
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]