Talofa Joseph,

You have for some time now been putting out posts which claim that there
is no such thing as property dualism, or that it can't be clearly defined,
or that it is just another form of physicalism, or whatever it is your
trying to say.

However, your posts have been highly problematic for three reasons.

Firstly the reasons you have been giving in defence of your view have been
hopelessly obscure, the fact that your are *still* trying to clarify what
it is your saying testifies to this. And I will show below that your
latest post still makes no sense.

Secondly, you have been stubbornly ignoring the posts of people who are
clarifying the view for you. For example, on several occasions, I have
pointed out that physicalism requires the supervenience of the phenomenal
on the physical, as both property dualism and substance dualism deny
supervenience. And I also think your view got flattened over on MindBrain
where a scientist posted a well worked out psychophysical theory of
consciousness which made use of Chalmers' property dualist framework.
Again, you conveniently ignore these points, and continue to put out
obscure posts arguing for the same old conclusion that has been decisively
refuted.

Thirdly, the only intelligible points that you have made have been blatant
strawman arguments. For example, in your second to last most recent post,
you say to Peter:

Yet I (and others) have pointed out to you on several occasions that both
physicalism and property dualism assume the existence of phenomenal
properties=conscious experiences, and both wish to account for phenomenal
propertes=conscious experiences under their respective frameworks. If the
ink marks "phenomenal properties" offend prejudice in you, which they
obviously do, then substitute "conscious experiences" each time you see
the phrase. Problem solved.

I am sorry for the frustrated tone of my post, but given the three points
I have made in the above, it is fair to say that these lists deserve a
higher standard then what has been contained so far in your posts in this
thread. And from what I have seen in other threads, you are capable of
better. [Perhaps the problem is the deplorable wikipedia webpage on PD?
You need to ignore it.]

Here is your most recent post on the topic:

WHAT? Claiming that there is a set of non-physical properties DOES NOT
require us to reject ANY of 1-4, what are you talking about? Let's assume
that there are some non-physical properties (as I do). Consistently with
(1), I can assume that the non-physical properties are properties of a
physical something - e.g., non-physical phenomenal properties are
properties of a physical organism. Consistently with (2) I can accept the
definition of substance monism. Consistently with (3) I can assume that
that defines physicalism (even though it doesn't really). Consistently
with (4) I can assume obviously assume it, given that it is a tautology.

So, what does your post come to this time?

Once again, the whole problem is that you are not dealing with what's been
said against you. [Ignore what Wiki says about property dualism, and
concentrate on what WE say.]
Despite this, I am going repeat what I have already said, though this time
I shall go into some extra detail. If you once again fail to deal with
what's been said, then I will assume that you are not being sincere and
will give up...

In what follows, I am going to define physicalism, and then, I will define
both substance dualism and property dualism in terms of how they conflict
with physicalism so defined.

Definition of "Physicalism":

(1a) There are (non-macroscopic) microphysical entities (of the sort that
physics posits).
(1b) (Non-macroscopic) microphysical entities constitute everything.
(2a) There are microphysical properties (which determine all microphysical
laws).
(2b) The microphysical properties instantiate (or realize) all other
properties, including all macroscopic properties (such that the
higher-level laws, which exist in virtue of higher level properties, are
nothing over and above microphysical laws).

Definition of "Substance Dualism":

The (Cartesian) substance dualist rejects (1b), as the substance dualist
believes that the mind is a macropscopic object, or substance, which is
not composed out of anything (let alone microphysical entities).
Presumably then, the substance dualist will also reject (2b), given that
the uncomposed macroscopic mind will exemplify irreducibly mental
properties, which do not rely for their instantiation on the instantiation
of microphysical (or any other) properties.

Definition of "Property Dualism":

Unlike the substance dualist, the property dualist accepts (1b), as well
as accepting (1a) and (2a). The property dualist only rejects (2b). Thus,
the property dualist accepts that all substances / objects / particulars
are microphysically composed. However, the property dualist believes that
there are a certain class of macroscopic properties (i.e. properties of
macroscopic objects), whose instantiation does not rely on the
instantiation of microphysical properties (properties of microphysical
objects). I will further clarify this with some ostensive definitions...

Ostensive definition of "property, whose instantiation relies on the
instantiation of microphysical properties":

Let's take something which is clearly a property and is clearly not an
object or substance or particular: life, or in other words, the property
of being alive. This example is of historical interest given that it was
once thought that this property did not rely for its instantiation on the
instantiation of microphsyical properties, but rather, life was thought to
consist in an irreducibly fundamental 'vital spirit'. But now, we
understand that the property of being alive does rely for tis
instantiation upon more fundamental properties. One exemplifies the
property of being alive if one roughly exemplifes the following
properties: metabolism, reproduction and adaptation. Now, these properties
can again be broken down. Metabolism, for example, reduces to certain
chemical transformations via a sequence of enzymes. Here, we are now
talking about the properties exemplified by entities at a lower level of
composition then the macropscopic level. So we have pretty much already
refuted property dualism ABOUT LIFE. The most fundamental microphysical
particles constitute the entities mentioned in chemical theory (the
chemical properties), and so chemical properties, again, rely for their
instantiation on the instantiation of the fundamental properties of
microphysical entities. This is what makes life a physical property - it
is microphysically instantiated, or realized.

Ostensive definition of "microphysical property":

Physics posits many properties which they take to be irreducibly
fundamental properties of irreducibly fundamental entites, to name a few:
spin, charge and mass.

These are the definitions, and clearly, property dualism is far different
from physicalism (and substance dualism). I am a property dualist because,
although I think all (macroscopic) objects, such as ourselves, are
microphysically constituted, I also think that we exemplify macroscopic
properties, that are irreducibly fundamental. They exist, not because they
are instantiated by more basic properties such as neurophysiological
properties (themselves instantiated by way of microphysical properties),
but rather because of fundamental relations which contingently hold
between the microphysical entities organised in a certain way, and these
irreducibly fundamental macroscopic properties.

Put crudley, conscious experiences are non-physical.

I believe this because I believe that entities and properties at different
levels of composition who constitute / instantiate each other, are related
necessarily rather than contingently. I believe that the necessary is
co-extensive with the apriori/analytic. From this I conclude that
physicalism implies that there is an in principle apriori entailment going
from the microphysical base to everything which supervenes upon it. From
the premise that there is no (in principle) physically respectable
analysis of phenomenal concepts, I then conclude that there can be no (in
principle) entailment from microphysics to phenomenal truths. From which I
conclude that physicalism is false. But the defence of this argument will
have to wait for another post. Here I hope simply to have sufficiently
defined the  competing metaphysical doctrines.

Kind Regards,
Kelvin.