Monism is usually applied in relation to the question of what
there is.  I don't know what there is, but I am interested in
analysing our conceptions of what we believe there to be.  
I'd have to subscribe to some sort of monism simply because
I can't see any way to make sense of there being multiple
substances that are so different as to be incapable of
interaction.

The words "foundational" and "ground" don't really work for
me without much more qualification.  I think that all explanations
are provisional and incomplete.  There are a great many
interesting questions about the human situation in which we find
ourselves.  While we can explore this situation through a variety
of experiences, the only way in which we can explore it
intellectually and articulate ideas about it is through language.
I'm interested in how we stand in that respect, and what we
can formulate as knowledge in the widest sense.

At the same time, I don't regard language as something that
simply models a given world of objects.  That there is a real world
of objects is my understanding of realism and I'm puzzled as to how
you can reject both that and the alternative claim that objects are
constructed through our own conceptualization.  

The claim that the status of objects is a depth rule of language
seems simply to reinforce the idea that objects depend on language
in a comprehensive way.  From an empirical point of view, and using
language uncritically, objects do have independent existence and
are indeed objective.  

But I would still regard us as entitled to stand back and ask questions
about the conditions of our sensible experiences, and the way in
which language supports our construction of objects.  For if objects
are not real, to what do they owe their existence, if not us?

On the other hand, developing a view of the conditions of our
experience may well have implications for how we understand our human
situation.  This in turn can have consequences for how we choose to act,
although the abstract nature of the considerations and the complexity of
the chain of consequences are such that we could not regard this as an
empirical test.

But then, you claim not to accept realism.  That raises the question of
exactly what objects are?  How is it that we describe our experiences in
terms of having impressions of objects while there are actually no real
objects?  These are the kind of philosophical questions that arise
concerning the conditions of our experience.

Or is the result of all our studies a single language game, the
language game of looking at language games?  In which case,
wouldn't it be rather like a meta-narrative?

What is it that makes poetry and prose essays two distinct language
games?  Mightn't they just as well be considered parts of the literature
language game?

If they are distinct because there are different rules for their writing,
exactly how far would we need to go in separating language games?
Is poetry in hexameters a different language game from poetry in
pentameters?  Is poetry in blank verse yet another language game?
When Georges Perec wrote "La Disparation" as a lipogram containing
no occurrence of the letter "e" was that a different language game from
other prose novels?  How does the distinction between the prose
language game and the poetry language game stand up to an essayist
who writes "It is in rhyming Alexandrines, but the language and the
matter of the work are purest prose"?

How, indeed, would we avoid the conclusion that each writer is
engaged in a different language game?  Or even that each work is a
distinct language game?  Once we start, I'm not sure how we would
ever bring a variety of works into a single language game.

Well, I'm not sure what to make of the above claim. You appear to
accept the notion that any philosophical argument must be grounded
somewhere. And by grounded you something given, something
incontestable, something which lies outside our power to alter or
change.

First, are the two candidates, language or practices, distinct?

Aren't practices language games and hence in words? Perhaps, you're
suggesting behavioral practices such as pointing, and even sitting and
walking. But these behaviors are not just physical movements. They are
meaningful. And if meaningful, there're conceptual. And if conceptual
are represented in some medium. I'm sure you recognize that your
proposition, that practices are foundational, is expressed in words.

But, I suspect this would not concern you because you hold that there
is something other than your words, which you can grasp in words. And
of course science adoptst this convention? Well, perhaps *that* is the
philosophical task, namely, to question the intelligibility of
conventions.  But you are not inclined because, as I read you, you
think of philosophy as a natural discipline, a anthropology of sorts.

I find this reading of Wittgenstein unfortunate. My strong claim is
that it leads, on the one hand, to a philosophy of conventionality
and, on the other hand, pseudo-science.

The pseudo science I have in mind is the humanistic pop-psychology
which treats any fashionable notion as if it were foundational, i.e.,
beyond reproach.

The philosophical convention which disturbs me is the "aping" of
science in which traditional questions of meaning, truth, etc. are
objectified and theorized as objects (language games) acting in
accordance to some rules imposed from above (depth grammar).

By the way, I spoke to Ted recently about a Wittgenstein
study group, as you suggested, and he may set one up
to meet at SRJC. He told me he would give you a call.

What philosophical purpose is served by Wittgenstein's
observation that our use of language is governed by
shared practices, which can be expressed by rules?
Looking at the rules gives us insights into the
formation of philosophical problems.

As I wrote to Martin, it is probably best to discuss
specific passages in Wittgenstein or in one of his
explicators. What you did above was attribute to
a Wittgensteinian Foundationalist statements he or
she wouldn't make. We'd do better to discuss
things Wittgenstein or his expert readers
actually wrote.

It helps to know what a Wittgenstein Foundationalist is.
It is someone who believes that language is founded
on something not linguistic.

in the last post, I wrote:

The idea that a philosophical project can find an answer
to why we exist is a fantasy. Bruce, how does such a
project fit in with your position as a pragmatist?

What Wittgenstein did was look at how the radical
skeptical question gets started -- if the question's
origins are not valid, one need not be concerned with
its answer.

Best,

Gary

Hey Gary, I'll be gone till late Sunday. Going to see my new Grandson.

Moving on. . . .

I suppose I am a monist in the sense that I think of
the universe as one complicated thing. I am a
dualist in the sense that I believe that language
is founded on something else.

That explanation seems neither provisional nor
incomplete to me. But it is a low level explanation,
little more than a description of an action. What I
am suggesting is that the more complicated and
theoretical an explanation gets, the more provisional
and incomplete it becomes. But that, also, is
probably too simple a response.

Suppose Bill said, "All explanations are provisional
because the meanings of words change over time and
words are fuzzy and so on."  I would respond that we
have to look at each explanation in its own context
and decide if it is provisional or not. A big
theoretical explanation of why explanations MUST
be provisional and incomplete is itself unreliable,
provisional, and so on.

Realists cannot prove with words that objects
exist independently of them, and Idealists cannot
prove the opposite. What is the point of an argument
that proves nothing and clarifies nothing? It's
better not to get into pointless arguments.

Where this approach can go wrong is where it
begins to generalize and make non-contextual
claims about how language works. As long as
one is specific and contextual, no problem.

Saying that we cannot prove with words that
objects are real does not mean that objects are
not real or are real.

We don't describe our experiences in terms of
having impressions of objects, do we? We say, "I
saw a horse," not "I  saw the impression of a horse."
And the reason for that is that we have no
alternative to ordinary "seeing".

We are all realists in our behavior. It proves nothing
but it is a good survival strategy. If the question
arises, "Do objects really exist?" are we dealing
with a legitimate question or are we dealing with
some kind of linguistic confusion? Wittgenstein
opted for linguistic confusion and tried to show
how it arose.

Gary wrote..

Gary wrote..

Gary, can I suggest that we end the Linguistic Monism thread and
consolidate the same on the _Philo Invest_ thread?

Maybe a philosopher can work well in some corner
of philosophy without being concerned with
grounding -- but I suspect that that would be hard
to bring off. If you are working away on some
corner of philosophy, well, what you say will turn
out to have some sort of foundational implication.
For example, Descartes assumed that language exists.

In this context, language is a human practice, but it
is different from other human practices like
walking, smiling, and so on. That is why we have
the different names for different practices:
talking, walking, smiling. Some practices are
built on other practices. You learn what a game
is before you learn how to castle in chess.

Bruce then raised some claims about Wittgenstein
that seemed off the mark to me. I'd prefer to discuss
Wittgenstein in the context of something Wittgenstein
wrote, and perhaps Bruce will join in the discussion
Martin and I are initiating.

Just a note: The teaching of spelling is founded
on dictionaries (records of practices), and
dictionaries keep changing, as do linguistic
practices. Foundations can be contingent.

Best,

Gary

Sure. It's question begging, namely, that if one cannot specify what
language is based on then one is committed to the view it is based on
nothing. The alternative viewpoint, mine, is that the search for
foundations is forever star crossed.

Which suggests that we should return to the beginning...Gary just what do
wish to accomplish conceptually by claiming that language has a foundation?
What question does it promsie to answer?

You are free to argue about whether that is validly attributed to Saussure,
or you can argue about the substance of the point.  But simply denigrating
Culler doesn't advance either argument.

Best,

Gary