At 04:20 PM 9/29/2001 +0100, you wrote:

Rodrigo <Vane...@yahoo.com>

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(c) 2001 by Analytic
http://analytic.ontologically.com/
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I think this exchange has illustrated how easy it is to
talk "at cross purposes" when talking about possible worlds
(i.e. for the hearer to construe a sentence in a language
other than that in which it was intended)

| >| [RV]
| >| My position is simple.  It is that there are many more possible worlds than
| >| the metaphysical essentialist admits.  I will describe just three unusual
| >| worlds to give you the general idea.  W1 is a possible world identical to
| >| the actual world in *all* physical respects, but unlike the actual world,
| >| Speranza lives in Boston and Rodrigo lives in Buenos Aires.  In this world,
| >| Speranza would do everything that I actually do, think my actual thoughts,
| >| be called "Rodrigo", and vice versa. W2 is a possible world identical to
| >| the actual world in *all* physical respects, but unlike the actual world,
| >| this pen does not exist.  In its place, there is another pen, just like
| >| this one in all physical respects.  Finally, W3 is a possible world in
| >| which some things are not self-identical.
| >
| > [RBJ]
| >Let me observe here that your possible world W1 is pathological,
| >in that all the available evidence in that world indicates that the person
| >in Boston is Rodrigo and the one in Buenos Aires is Speranza.
| >This evidence in W1 that these claims expressed in the language
| >which is called English in W1 are true is overwhelming.
|
| I see it a different way.  I would say that the evidence in W1 is
| overwhelmingly in favor of the claims that Speranza lives in Boston and
| Rodrigo lives in Buenos Aires.

What I meant to say was, that the evidence in W1 supports the
truth of the sentence "Rodrigo lives in Boston" in the language known
as English in W1.
e.g. the person in Boston actually calls himself Rodrigo,
and so do his friends.
This might possibly have the same meaning as the sentence
"Speranza lives in Boston" in the language you just used
(but which is not known to Rodrigo or Speranza in W1)

| >If the proposition "Speranza lives in Boston" is true in W1,
| >it cannot be expressed in the language known as English in W1.
|
| Why not?  It could be expressed with the sentence "Rodrigo lives in
| Boston", since "Rodrigo" in W1 refers to Speranza.

What I meant to say was that if the sentence "Speranza lives in Boston"
is true in some language L, then that language is not the
language known as English in W1.

| >This suggests that the notion of "possible world" is not an absolute
| >notion but one relative to a language (or a linguistic framework
| >in Carnap speak), which is indeed my own position.
|
| It does?  I don't see that this suggestion follows at all.

Because a change in the assignment of names to individuals
by itself suffices to change the possible world, and vocabulary
is language specific.

If language L contains the name "Speranza" then a possible
world involves an assignement to that name (else how could
changing this make a different possible world).
But surely this is not the case for a language in which the
name Speranza does not occur?

This is analogous to the definition of an interpretation of
a first order language.
An interpretation must provide an assignment to the constants
of the language, but not to any constants not in the language.
This concept of interpretation is relative to a specific first order
language.
A reasonable account of what possible worlds are can be
based on a similar arrangement.
I would argue against any absolute conception of the
notion of possible world, that other conceptions are
possible and there is no basis for chosing between them.

Roger Jones

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At 04:28 PM 10/1/2001 +0100, you wrote:

So, "Rodrigo lives in Boston" is a sentence of English0, true in W0 and
false in W1, but it is also a sentence of English1, true in W1 and false in
W0.  With me?

Rodrigo <Vane...@yahoo.com>

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| >| >[RBJ]
| >| >If the proposition "Speranza lives in Boston" is true in W1,
| >| >it cannot be expressed in the language known as English in W1.
| >|
| >| [RV]
| >| Why not?  It could be expressed with the sentence "Rodrigo lives in
| >| Boston", since "Rodrigo" in W1 refers to Speranza.
| >
| > [RBJ]
| >What I meant to say was that if the sentence "Speranza lives in Boston"
| >is true in some language L, then that language is not the
| >language known as English in W1.
|
| [RV]
| Yes, I didn't know exactly *how* I had misunderstood, but there was no
| question that we were poorly equipped to avoid confusion.  I would like to
| recommend that we speak only of sentences, and not also of propositions, to
| avoid questions of interlinguistic synonymy.  Also, let us speak of
| English0 as the language spoken in W0, the actual world, and English1 as
| the language spoken in W1.  Finally, let us say that a sentence is true in
| W0, the actual world, if it is just true, and that it is true in W1 if it
| is true according to the counterfactual description of W1.
|
| So, "Rodrigo lives in Boston" is a sentence of English0, true in W0 and
| false in W1, but it is also a sentence of English1, true in W1 and false in
| W0.  With me?

Yes.

| >| >[RBJ]
| >| >This suggests that the notion of "possible world" is not an absolute
| >| >notion but one relative to a language (or a linguistic framework
| >| >in Carnap speak), which is indeed my own position.
| >|
| >| [RV]
| >| It does?  I don't see that this suggestion follows at all.
| >
| > [RBJ]
| >Because a change in the assignment of names to individuals
| >by itself suffices to change the possible world, and vocabulary
| >is language specific.
|
| [RV]
| Aren't you begging the question by assuming that "a change in the
| assignment of names to individuals by itself suffices to change the
| possible world"?

No.
I am accepting your suggestion that W1 is a possible world
distinct from W0 even though it differs only in the denotations
of "Rodrigo" and "Speranza" and in no other respect,
and exploring the consequences of that supposition.

Identity criteria for possible worlds give us a clue as
to their nature and content.

| > [RBJ]
| >If language L contains the name "Speranza" then a possible
| >world involves an assignement to that name (else how could
| >changing this make a different possible world).
| >But surely this is not the case for a language in which the
| >name Speranza does not occur?
|
| [RV]
| A language in which the name "Speranza" does not occur cannot be used to
| describe W1, but W1 would still be a possible world, just as Speranza would
| still exist if there were no language in which "Speranza" occured. I just
| don't yet see how possibility is relative to a language.

Such a language can be used to talk about a world physically
indistinguishable from W1.
Surely a world of which a language cannot speak is not
a possible world as far as that language is concerned?

I could elaborate a conception of possible world which
is specific to language, using methods similar to those
which I would used (have used) to make more precise the
concept of analyticity (which indeed, under this conception
is equivalent to "necessary" and defined in terms of possible
worlds).

It seems to me that some of the things you have said
about what possible worlds there are come out right under
that conception.

However, I have no conception myself of any notion
of possible world which is not coupled with what has been
called the linguistic conception of necessity and so I
am not able to grasp your own ideas on this.

It would help me perhaps if you could consider the
identity criteria for your possible worlds and
comment on whether these have the implications
I imagine them to have for the content of a possible world.

It seems to me, that by positing a possible world W1
physically identical to W0 but distinct from it only
in the question of which entities are referred to by certain
names, you have put forward identity criteria which
entail that possible worlds contain information about
the language which is used to talk of them, and that
the conception of possible world you are talking of
therefore becomes relative to the language.

Can you explain to me how your view that W1 is
a possible world distinct from W0 is compatible with
the independence of the concept from language?

Roger Jones

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At 07:21 AM 10/4/2001 +0100, you wrote:

Speranza,

At 04:14 AM 10/1/2001 -0300, you wrote:

Rodrigo <Vane...@yahoo.com>

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| >| [RV]
| >| Aren't you begging the question by assuming that "a change in the
| >| assignment of names to individuals by itself suffices to change the
| >| possible world"?
| >
| > [RBJ]
| >No.
| >I am accepting your suggestion that W1 is a possible world
| >distinct from W0 even though it differs only in the denotations
| >of "Rodrigo" and "Speranza" and in no other respect,
| >and exploring the consequences of that supposition.
|
| [RV]
| But that is not how I identified W1.  I didn't speak of denotations.  I
| said that W1 is just like W0, the actual world, in every physical respect,
| except that Rodrigo lives in Buenos Aires and Speranza lives in Boston.

You actually said (first post of this thread)

"W1 is a possible world identical to
the actual world in *all* physical respects, but unlike the actual world,
Speranza lives in Boston and Rodrigo lives in Buenos Aires."

The obvious reading of this seems to me contradictory.
(if W1 is the same in all physical respects then Rodrigo
lives in Boston)
so by what I now suspect may be Gricean implicature
I decided that you could  not have meant that either
of these gentleman had a different abode.
In retrospect I must have presumed that in
the language we are using to speak of W0 and W1.
(possibly the English of W0) names
have no sense and their reference is contingent.
Consequently it is possible that they might refer to
something other than their reference in W0, and
there must be possible worlds in which they do,
among which is W1.

In this context I described W1 in the following way:
'W1 is a possible world distinct from W0 even though it
differs only in the denotations of "Rodrigo" and "Speranza"
and in no other respect'
and when I wrote it I thought it was an uncontroversial
paraphrase of your description of W1 (with the minor
advantage of being intelligible without implicature).
.
Can you explain what you consider be the relevant difference?

Roger Jones

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(c) 2001 by Analytic
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I, too, am finding it hard to figure out what's supposed to be going
on in W1.

As Stephen Yablo points out in

http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/coulda.pdf

there's a sense in which the Kripkean explorer of possible worlds is
supposed to conduct all his inquiries in his home language, ignoring
what things happen to be called in W1.

For example, "two plus two equals four" is necessary because (as we
know somehow) there is no possible world in which it is false. But
there are worlds in which the sentence "two plus two equals four"
MEANS "seven is even". These worlds don't count, according to Kripke!
(cf N & N, 77)

Just to make things even more confusing, it occurs to me that a
person's bearing a name is never entirely a non-physical property. It
has physical consequences like Rodrigo's friend in Boston emitting
sound waves which R. recognizes as the greeting "Yo Rodrigo!" In W0
the man sitting at the computer turns around to greet his friend, in
W1 he doesn't. Or does he? This might be an entirely trivial and
irrelevant observation, but in this murky context I honestly can't
tell whether it is or not.

Larry

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My problems with "essence" and "identity" can be avoided if instead of
thinking of the two propositions "Speranza lives in Buenos Aires & Rodrigo
in Boston", we have instead, "the soccer ball is red, and the softball is
blue. I.e. talk of descriptions instead of proper names. You'll see how
little impact on cosmology a change of colours into those objects will do.
And the fact that neither object has a proper name will make your
investigations even less theoretically-burdened, or something...

                        J L Speranza, Esq
Country                                         Town
St Michael's Hall                               Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611                                Calle Arenales 2021  
La Plata CP 1900                                Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 541148241050                                Tel 542214257817
                        BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
                http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls.htm
                        j...@netverk.com.ar

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http://analytic.ontologically.com/
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At 11:05 AM 10/8/2001 -0300, you wrote:

By the way, it appears that my Rodrigo-Speranza switch is in the literature
already.  Chisholm wrote in the very first volume of _Nous_ (1967) of a
possible world in which Noah is qualitatively just like Adam, and Adam is
qualitatively just like Noah.  The possible world is qualititatively
identical to the actual world, but distinct from the actual world in the
qualitative properties of Adam and Noah.  He chose a better example than I
did, and, unlike me, also bothered to motivated the example by describing
interim worlds in which Noah is a little more like Adam than he actually
is, and vice versa.  Also unlike me, he took these considerations to argue
*against* de re necessity.  Lewis, on the other hand, embraces the example
and uses it to argue that de re representation doesn't supervene on
qualitative representation.  The ground is slipping...  aiiieee!

Rodrigo <Vane...@yahoo.com>

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Transworld Identity ... theory of de re possibilities. This is illustrated
by Chisholm's example of the possibility of Adam and Noah "swapping roles."
A linguistic ersatzer can easily ...
http://www.philarete.home.mindspring.com/philosophy/transworld.html

Must say I like the formal (metaphysical) derivations of "counterpart
theory"... if only for the fun of it!
===
"The problem of transworld identity is a misnamed problem. There are no
philosophical problems about identity. The problem should be called, the
problem of de re, or non-qualitative, possibilities."
      "Those who believe that our sentential operators "Poss" and "Nec" are
quantifiers over possible worlds (however they conceive of things) must say
that in some way these possible worlds represent, or misrepresent, this
universe we live in. It is possible that there be a talking horse."
      "Modal realists, such as Lewis, hold that a possible world represents
the universe (for Lewis, "the actual world") as containing a talking horse
by having a literal talking horse as a part."
      "We should like to say not only that it is possible that there be a
talking horse, but also it is possible that Seattle Slew be a talking
horse; or, as we may put it (to make the label "de re" truly deserved), it
is possible of Seattle Slew that she be a talking horse. A possible world
according to which Seattle Slew is a talking horse must not only represent
the universe as containing a talking horse, but it must represent Seattle
Slew as a talking horse."
     "Another example that seems to show the need for de re representation
independent of purely qualitative representation is an example of
Chisholm's."
     "He assumes that it is possible that Adam be a little more like Noah
than he actually is, i.e. that there is a world that represents Adam as
being a little more like Noah than he actually is, and vice-versa for Noah.
If that world had been actual, it still would have been possible that Adam
be a little more like Noah, and Noah a little more like Adam. So there is
another world that represents Adam as even more like Noah, and Noah even
more like Adam. By continual iteration, we eventually get to a world that
represents the universe as qualitatively like it actually is, but which
represents Noah as occupying the Adam role (being the first man, being
married to Eve, getting kicked out of Eden for eating the apple, etc.) and
Adam as occupying the Noah role (building the ark, etc.). This world
doesn't differ from the actual world (the world that doesn't misrepresent
the universe in any way) in its qualitative representation, but does differ
from the actual world in its de re representation of Adam and Noah. Again,
de re representation of possibilities doesn't supervene on de re
representation of possibilities."
     "Lewis remains agnostic about the existence of qualitatively
indiscernible worlds, but his counterpart theory can handle the possibility
that the world be qualitatively just like it actually is, but differ in the
facts about individuals."
    "The world that represents the universe qualitatively just as it is,
but with

            Adam

occupying the

            Noah

role and vice-versa may well be the actual world itself. Under a certain
counterpart relation,

            Noah

himself qualifies as a

           "counterpart"

of

            Adam:

thus there is a world (viz. the actual one) that is qualitatively just like
the actual one, in which there is a counterpart of Adam (viz. Noah himself)
who occupies the Noah role."
     "It seems that the ersatzer will need to make use of counterpart
theory as well in her theory of de re possibilities. This is illustrated by
Chisholm's example of the possibility of Adam and Noah "swapping roles." A
linguistic ersatzer can easily construct possible worlds according to which
I and President Clinton swap roles: the consistent story says "Brock became
governor of Arkansas, and then became president of the U.S. in 1992, etc."
and "President Clinton was born in Memphis in 1970, and went to grad school
in philosophy, etc." But "Brock" and "Clinton" refer to actual individuals,
so the ersatzer can make use of names for us in his language, whereas
"Adam" and "Noah" do not refer to anything actual: these expressions are
only fictionally names. The actual Adam has no counterparts in any world,
for there is no such person as Adam. The linguistic ersatzer needs to make
some use of counterpart theory to describe the two possibilities of
Chisholm's example: "There is a possible world according to which someone
was the first man, etc., and according to which someone else built the ark;
and there is a possible world according to which someone was the first man,
etc., and someone else built the ark, etc.; and the open sentence in the
first world 'x is the first man, etc.' is a counterpart sentence of the
sentence 'x built the ark, etc.' in the second world, and vice-versa.""
((c) B Sides.)

References
Chisholm R M. Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Nous 1.
Repr M Loux, ed., The Possible & the Actual. Cornell.
Kripke S A Naming & Necessity. Harvard.
Lewis D K. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell.
===
                        J L Speranza, Esq
Country                                         Town
St Michael's Hall                               Suite 5/8
Calle 58, No 611                                Calle Arenales 2021  
La Plata CP 1900                                Recoleta CP 1124
Tel 541148241050                                Tel 542214257817
                        BUENOS AIRES, Argentina
                http://www.netverk.com.ar/~jls.htm
                        j...@netverk.com.ar

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http://analytic.ontologically.com/
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic/